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wantsto knowmore.First,underwhatconditionsis thelaw
immediately
ways in
mostlikelyto be autonomous?Second, what are the different
legal theory
whichthelaw is, in fact,autonomous?Much contemporary
is relevantto thesequestions.The namesofUnger,Selznick,Nonet,and
otherscometo mind.Watson'sthesisis too simpleto make even a partial
answerto thesequestions.
There are importantgeneraltheoreticalproblemsin our attemptsto
development,notjust in law but in
understandautonomousinstitutional
organizations,in the state (see, e.g., the "autonomyof the state"literature),or in science(as in the attemptto distinguishthe internaland the
externalhistoryofscience).Watson'sexamplesare quitegermaneto these
and one can learn a greatdeal fromthem.But Watson'sgeneral
efforts,
enoughto enterusefullyintotheois simplynotdifferentiated
hypothesis
reticaldebate.
DistributiveJustice: A Social-PsychologicalPerspective. By Morton
Deutsch.New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1985. Pp. vii+ 313.

$27.50.

BarryMarkovsky
UniversityofIowa
Assertingthatjustice concernspervade social life,MortonDeutsch has
compiledtheresultsofa decade of thinkingand researchin areas related
to distributive
justice. Part I containssix chapterson theory,partII has
six on research,and part III has four applicationchapters.Approximately40% ofDistributiveJusticehas been adapted frompriorpublications.The textis easy to read and not at all technicalor overburdened
withterminology.
Its utilityas an introduction
to the field,however,is
limitedsince it providesno comprehensive
literaturereviewand details
onlyone of the manyprogramsof researchin the area.
Nine key featuresof "systemsof distributivejustice" appear in the
introduction,servingas the platformfromwhich any such systemis
viewed.Theyinclude(1) characteristics
ofthegoodorharmbeingdistributed,(2) social roles,(3) stylingand timingofthedistribution,
(4) distributional values (e.g., need, equality,merit),(5) criteriaforimplementing
values (e.g., workqualityas a meritcriterion),
of crite(6) measurement
ria, (7) proceduresfordecidingon the above features,(8) boundariesof
the distribution
system,and (9) social consequencesof the system.The
introduction
also identifiesspecificissues such as how "self-esteem,
attitudestowardworkand relationswithfellowgroupmembers,as well as
individualand group productivity,
[are] affectedby the way a group's
earningsare distributedwithinthe group. . . whichsocial and psychological factorsdeterminepreferencesfor one or another distributive
value . . . [and] theconditionsthatlead peopleto preferegalitarianrather
than meritocratic
values" (p. 4).
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There are two review chapters. Chapter 2, "A Critique of Equity
Theory,"addressesmajor statementsthrough1978, brieflynotingsome
of the issues that these theoriesdid not address. There are no actual
critiquesbased on logical or empiricalanalyses.Chapter7, "Theoretical
OverviewoftheArea," includessummariesofstatements
bythe"leading
theorists."That review bringsus up to the early 1980s, thoughonly
througha samplingof seven out of thenumeroustheorists
and researchers contributing
to thisfield.Several major worksare not discussed.
Part I is best consideredmetatheoretical.
As such, ratherthan being
providedwitha theoryofdistributive
justice,we are showntheconcepts
thattheauthorbelievesare worthdeveloping,theissuesand factorsthat
he considersimportant,what previousworkbears on theseissues, and
how to go about developingand testingtheories.This approachentails
certainstrengths
and weaknesses.Deutsch has clearlyindicatedthe potentialfortheoriesof broad scope in whichjusticeprocessesare boththe
of otherimportantsocial phenomena.
consequencesand determinants
Connectionsbetweenindividualand collectivelevels are suggested,and
linksare forgedwithpoliticalscience,economics,and numeroussubdisciplinesof psychologyand sociology.The readercannotbut be impressed
withthe richnessand potentialof the fieldof distributive
justice.
The weaknesses stem fromattemptsto generalizefromthe metain partI and themostlyexploratory
theorizing
researchof partII. First,
no explicittheoryis developedfromthe methatheory.
"Justice"is never
defined.At various points,it is treatedas a psychologicalstate,a social
condition,a reward evaluation, and an evaluation of the reward-deliveringmechanisms.Otherkeytermsare also used inconsistently.
Second, argumentsare neversystematized.Many statements
take theform
"x may affecty." Too much emphasisis placed on the fuzzybut oftrepeated"Deutsch'scrudelaw of social relations,"whichstatesthat"the
characteristic
processesand effectselicitedby a giventypeof social relationshipalso tend to elicitthat typeof social relationship."Third, the
intendeddomainor scope ofthesestatements
is nevergiven.Exploratory
researchis reported-some fromnaturalsettings,mostfromthelaboratory-and the resultsgeneralizedindiscriminately,
with insufficient
attentionpaid to the conditionsunderlyingobserved phenomena.Generalizingdirectlyfromexperiments
to naturalsettings(partIII) without
the guidanceof a scope-defined
theoryfostersconfusionover the proper
theory-testing
role of experimentalresearch.
MortonDeutsch believes(correctly,
I think)thathe has an important
messageforus. Numeroustimesthroughoutthe book he expresseshis
convictionofand givesevidenceforthegeneralsuperiority
ofcooperative
overcompetitivesocial systems.Much ofthebook is an attemptto prove
thisconvictionby demonstrating
a positivecorrelationbetweencooperative relationshipsand the perceptionof theiroutcomesas just. Applicationsto educationalsystems,egalitarianeconomicsystems,and international relationsillustratethe potentialbenefitsof cooperation.But a
strongerbridge to existingtheoryand researchon justice judgments
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would have been helpful.The researchand discussionsprovidefoodfor
thoughtbut do not satisfy.
In sum, DistributiveJusticedoes not meetits goals. Its lack of rigor
rendersthe theoryless applicable than claimed to the importantsocial
issues that are discussed. However, Morton Deutsch has made some
contributions
ofconsiderablevalue in havingus consider
metatheoretical
and consequencesfromsome new angles. The book
justicedeterminants
identifies
problemsand directionsforsolutions,and thatis neededin an
area thatis richin ideas but not quite so well offtheoretically.
Law and Order. By Ralf Dahrendorf.London: Steven; Boulder, Col.:
Westview,1986. Pp. 179. $20.00.
IrvingLouis Horowitz
RutgersUniversity
Whenan outstandingtalentand a beacon forsocial sciencewritesa new
book or, as is here the case, deliversa seriesof lectures(the Hamlyn
Lectures,to "furtheramong the Common People of Great Britainand
NorthernIrelandtheknowledgeof ComparativeJurisprudence
and Ethnology")and thatseriesis magicallytransformed
intoa book,it behooves
the scholarlycommunityto sit up and take notice. This is doubly so
because the volumeentitledLaw and Orderis writtenby a self-declared
"unreconstructed
liberal." But such self-definition
is
eighteenth-century
onlypartiallyaccurate.For, in fact,Ralf Dahrendorf-sociologist,educator,and politician-is verymucha childofhis age, whichspansmuch
of 20th-century
Europe.
It is fascinating
that,forthis18th-century
liberal,thefigureswho loom
largestin his discussionoflaw and orderare notDiderotor evenMontesquieu butRousseau and Hobbes, thecounter-Enlightenment
figureofthe
18thcenturyand the quintessentialfigureof the 17th-century
secularizationof politics,respectively.Dahrendorf'sreadingof Rousseau as a democratmay surprisethose who sometimesjuxtapose Rousseau and the
Enlightenment.
But in emphasizingtheideas of "natural"goodnessand
"social" deformation,
Rousseau's beliefin increasinglifechances,liberty,
and the freedomto choose, as well as in determining
what is chosen,
Dahrendorfmakesa strongcase fora figurewho notonlycombinedlaw
withorderbut appreciatedthehumancapacityto movesidewaysno less
adeptlythanforward.
If Rousseau providesthe motifof liberty,Hobbes offerstheleitmotiv
of order.He does so by indirection,
in Dahrendorf'sconsideration
ofthe
Hobbesian Behemothas a conditionoflawlessness,chaos, and rebellion.
Ultimately,the Anarch bringsabout the need forLeviathan. Dahrendorf'sconcernis notwiththehistoryofideas alone butwith"a new wave
of totalitarianism"
that could "sweep the world,"a worldin whichthe
delicatebalance of law and ordertipsdramaticallyand fatefully
toward
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